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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMA KOCHA, 
Plaintiff
 9 
vs. 
GIBSON PRODUCTS COMPANY, A 
Utah Corporation, and MAYTEX 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, A 
Texas Corporation, 
Defendants. 
MAYTEX MANUFACTURING COM-
PANY, A Texas Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNIVERSAL CARRIER COMPANY, 
A Corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries allegedly 
suffered by plaintiff who was a business invitee on the 
premises of Gibson Discount Center in Murray, Utah. 
Case No. 
13887 
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The named defendants were Gibson Products Company, 
a Utah Corporation, (referred to hereafter as "Gibson"), 
the owner of the store, and Maytex Manufacturing Com-
pany, a Texas Corporation, (referred to hereafter as 
"Maytex"), who supplied certain metal display racks 
to the store. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant, Maytex, filed a Third-Party Complaint 
against Universal Carrier Company, a Texas Corpora-
tion, (referred to hereafter as "Universal"). Upon mo-
tion of Universal, the Third-Party Complaint was dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction by the Honorable Maurice 
D. Jones, sitting as a Judge in the Third Judicial Dis-
trict, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Maytex, seeks a reversal of the Order of 
the District Court dismissing the Third-Party Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff in this action claims to have suffered per-
sonal injuries when she struck her leg on a wire merchan-
dise display rack which allegedly was protruding into 
the aisle when she was shopping at the Gibson Discount 
Center. In her Complaint, she seeks damages against 
Gibson, the store owner, and against Maytex, whom she 
alleges supplied the display racks to the store (R-l). The 
allegations against Maytex are that the display racks 
were defectively designed and manufactured and sepa-
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rate causes of action are set forth in the pleadings based 
upon negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability 
in tort (R-l). 
After the Complaint was filed, Maytex filed a Third-
Party Complaint against Universal pursuant to Rule 14, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The allegations in the 
Third-Party Complaint are to the effect that the display 
rack in question had been designed and manufactured 
by Universal, and in the event Maytex is liable to plain-
tiff, then in such event, Universal would be liable to 
Maytex under principles of common law indemnification 
(R-15). Universal was served with process in Texas pur-
suant to the Utah Long-Arm Statute (Title 78, Chapter 
27, Utah Code Annotated). 
Universal filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that 
it was not subject to jurisdiction in the courts of the 
State of Utah (R-31). The Motion was supported by 
an Affidavit of an officer of the corporation stating 
merely that Universal is not licensed to do business in 
Utah and does not sell its products directly to buyers 
within the State of Utah (R-33). There is nothing in 
the affidavit disputing the allegations of Maytex in its 
Third-Party Complaint that Universal was, in fact, the 
manufacturer and designer of the display rack. Nor is 
there anything in the affidavit indicating that Universal 
did not purposefully intend its products to come into the 
State of Utah. Nor is there anything to even indicate 
that the sale in question involved an isolated transac-
tion; for all we know from the state of the record, the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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respondent may well have thousands of its manufactured 
products in use in stores throughout the State of Utah. 
All of these facts would have to be considered in the light 
most favorable to Maytex for the purpose of the Motion 
to Dismiss. 
The trial court granted Universale Motion to Dis-
miss which is the judgment from which Maytex appeals. 
The issue on appeal is thus whether an intermediate 
seller (such as a wholesaler or distributor) of an alleg-
edly defective product causing injury in Utah can invoke 
long-arm jurisdiction over the designer and manufacturer 
from which it purchased the product outside of the state. 
The Order of the District Court dismissing the 
Third-Party Complaint is a final order as between the 
Third-Party plaintiff and Third-Party defendant. The 
plaintiffs theory of recovery is based upon joint and 
several liability. The plaintiff is not concerned about 
whom she collects from. Whether or not the appeal is 
affirmed or reversed will not affect the final determina-
tion of the issues remaining between the plaintiff and 
other defendants. Under such circumstances, the author-
ities generally hold that the interests of the parties are 
severable and the dismissal of the Third-Party Complaint 
would constitute a final judgment from which an appeal 
would he. Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy, et al., 
93 Utah 426, 73 P. 2d 1277; Keenan v. Dean, 134 C. A. 
2d 189, 285 P. 2d 300; Oaks v. Rojcewicz, Alaska, 409 
P. 2d 839; Bear River Valley Orchard Company v. Han-
ley, 15 Utah 506, 50 P. 611. 
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ARGUMENT 
P O I N T ! 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS JURISDIC-
TION OVER THE THIRD-PARTY DEFEN-
DANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRO-
VISIONS OF CHAPTER 27, TITLE 78, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (LONG ARM STAT-
UTE). 
Section 78-27-24, Utah Code Annotated, enumerates 
the type of activity that will subject a non-resident to 
jurisdiotion in the Utah State Courts. Among the ac-
tivities listed is subsection (3): 
"The causing of any injury within this state, 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty." 
The intent of the legislature in adopting the Utah 
Long Arm Statute is to "insure maximum protection to 
citizens of this state" and "to assert jurisdiction over 
non-resident defendants to the fullest extent permitted 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution." Section 78-27-22. 
Most Utah Cases concerning application of the Long 
Arm Statute have dealt with Section 78-27-24(1) "the 
transaction of any business within this state." See For-
eign Study League v. Holland-American Line9 27 Utah 
2d 442, 497 P. 2d 244 and Hill v. Zale Corporation, 25 
Utah 2d 357, 482 P. 2d 332. These cases both discuss 
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the question of whether the business activities within 
the state are significant enough to constitute minimum 
contacts thus justifying inpersonam jurisdiction. One of 
the few Utah cases dealing with section 78-27-24(3) is 
Hydroswift Corporation v. Louie's Boats and Motors, 
Inc., 27 Utah 2d 233, 494 P. 2d 532. In Hydroswift the 
tortious activity alleged was a conversion of title to some 
boats in Oregon. The tortious activity did not take place 
in Utah and thus jurisdiction was lacking. 
Section 78-27-24(3) extends personal jurisdiction to 
non-residents causing "any injury within the state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty". Personal 
jurisdiction is wholly dependent upon the defendant's 
alleged tortious conduct and not upon his previous busi-
ness i^tionship with Utah residents. However, this 
section is limited by the due process requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. It is significant to note that the United States Su-
preme Court held in International Shoe Company v. 
State of Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 313, 66 S, Ct. 156 
(1945), that certain "acts" because of their nature and 
quality and circumstances of their commission, may be 
deemed sufficient to render the [non-resident] liable to 
suit. By citing tortious injury cases involving non-resi-
dent motorists, the court inferred that even an isolated 
instance of tortious conduct is a sufficient "act" for 
establishment of minimum contacts. 
In applying minimum contacts to the express lan-
guage of the Utah Statute, a Note, Inpersonam Jurisdic-
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tion Expanded: Utah's Long-Arm Statute, 1970 Utah 
L. Rev. 222 is very helpful. At page 236 of this article 
the author states: 
In applying the Supreme Court standards to 
tort and breach of warranty eases, State Courts 
have required varying amounts of activity be-
fore assuming personal jurisdiction. They uni-
formly uphold personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident who physically enters a state and com-
mits a tort. Courts, however, have been more 
reluctant to assume personal jurisdiction over 
out-of-state manufacturers whose only contact 
with the forum state is the presence of the de-
fective product. This reluctance has been espe-
cially noticeable when the particular state long 
arm statute limits jurisdiction to "com-
mission of the tortious act within the state." 
Some courts interpreting this language have 
concluded that the tortious act of manufactur-
ing occurred outside the state and is therefore 
not within the ambit of the statute. Other 
courts have circumvented this language by 
reasoning that the injury is actually the cul-
mination of the tortious act. Because the Utah 
Act only requires a ''causing of injury within 
the state", the situs of the tortious act is im-
material. 
This reasoning is supported by the decision in Gray 
v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 
111. App. 2d 432, 176 N. E. 2d 761 (1961). In Gray it 
was held that a foreign corporation which sold compon-
ent parts of water heaters purposefully intended that 
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the parts be used in other states even though this in-
ference was not supported with direct evidence. The 
Nevada Supreme Court has held in Metal-Matic, Inc. 
v. Eighth Judicial District, 82 Nev. 263, 415 P. 2d 617, 
that a non-resident manufacturer's activity was purpose-
ful if it could have reasonably foreseen Nevada as a mar-
ket for its product. In Buckeye Boiler Company v. Su-
perior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 133, 458 P. 2d 57 (1969), the 
non-resident manufacturer was subjected to inpersonam 
jurisdiction because the non-resident manufacturer "did 
not allege . . . that the tank . . . arrived in California in 
a manner so fortuitous and unforeseeable as to demon-
strate that its placement here was not purposeful". No 
such allegation has ever been made by the respondent 
manufacturer in the instant case. 
The case of Mountain States Sports, Inc. v. Shar-
man, 353 F. Supp. 613 (1972), examines in detail the re-
quirements for due process under section 78-27-24(3). 
This case involved the defendant's alleged tortious inter-
ference with a personal service contract within Utah. The 
defendant's request to quash service under the Utah 
Long-Arm Statute was denied. In this well-reasoned 
opinion District Judge Aldon J. Anderson reduced the 
Fourteenth Amendment question of due process to "the 
twin tests of fairness-resonableness to the defendant on 
the one side and territorial respect for sister states due 
spheres on the other." 
In considering the test of fairness-reasonableness the 
court lists a number of factors to be considered. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Fairness and reasonableness to the present de-
fendants may be measured by a number of 
factors including the foreseeability of the al-
leged injury in Utah, the extent to which de-
fendants engage in interstate commerce and to 
which they have sought the protection of the 
state, the nature and seriousness of alleged in-
jury and the general convenience of defending 
in Utah." 
In the case before the court all of these factors are 
met. By purposefully placing the rack in interstate com-
merce it is foreseeable that an injury could result in 
Utah. It is undisputed that the respondents aire engaged 
in interstate commerce and are thus beneficiaries of the 
protection of the Utah State Laws. It is true that the 
respondents had no contact with Utah when the rack 
was first placed into the flow of interstate commerce, 
however, the injury involved is of a very personal na-
ture and thus enhances Utah's interest in serving as the 
forum. On this basis the requirements of fairness and 
reasonableness to the respondent is not offended by a 
finding of jurisdiction. 
Judge Anderson points out that the test of "terri-
torial respect for sister states due spehres" is that if the 
forum state has "sufficient contacts with the transaction 
or a party to make it, in relation to other states, a logical 
forum for adjudication". While both appellant and re-
spondent are Texas Corporations their contacts with 
Utah in the situation before the court are greater than 
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with any other sister states. Thus Utah is the proper 
forum in relation to the present dispute. 
In finding personal jurisdiction in the Sharman case 
under section 78-27-24(3), Judge Anderson holds that 
all that is necessary before proceeding to trial is a "good 
faith allegation of injury". Omitting Citations. Since 
the jurisdictional question is closely tied to the merits 
of the case "its final determination is better postponed 
until trial in order to prevent a summary decision on 
the merits without the ordinary incidents of the trial 
including the right to jury". 
Pterhaps the strongest authority supporting appel-
lant's position is the very recent case of Pellegrini v. 
Sachs & Son, Utah 2d , 522 P. 2d 104 (1974). In 
this case the court held that this section of the Long-
Arm Statute did not extend to a dealer who sells goods 
which come into the state. However, the court makes 
a distinction between a dealer and a manufacturer whose 
products do come into the state purposefully. 
I t is essential in each case that there be some 
act by which the defendant purposefully avails 
himself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the bene-
fits and protections of its laws. 
In her "situs of causation" argument plaintiff 
cites a number of cases as being quite liberal in 
approving jurisdiction over non-residents in 
the states where products have caused injury. 
But it will be found that most of those cases 
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are against manufacturers. The adjudications 
are on the ground that in sending their wares 
into foreign states they have a substantial and 
continuing interest in the sale and distribution; 
and that their conduct through their agents in 
promoting those objectives is sufficient to meet 
the "minimum contacts'' test. 
We are cognizant that our ruling herein makes 
what may be regarded as a somewhat techni-
cal distinction between those adjudications as 
to manufacturers, and the situation presented 
here, concerning a dealer. But we think that 
distinction is both correct under the law and 
justified as a matter of policy. Differing from 
the manufacturer, a dealer (defendant Sachs) 
has little or no interest in the sale of similar 
products in the foreign state. 
The distinction made in the Pellegrini case between 
a dealer and a manufacturer is directly in point in the 
instant case. The manufacturer of products sold in in-
terstate commerce such as display racks for large mer-
chandising stores has a substantial and continuing in-
terest in marketing its products beyond the boundaries 
of the state where the manufacturing took place. It can-
not insulate itself from suit by selling through a whole-
saler or other intermediary who in turn sells the product 
in the State of Utah. The very purpose of the Long-Arm 
Statute is to pierce this type of jurisdictional veil. This 
is the thrust of the Pellegrini case and the reason why 
the court made the very logical distinction between a 
manufacturer and a dealer; a manufacturer normally has 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
an interest in marketing its products anywhere they can 
be sold, while a dealer normally has no interest in selling 
beyond its local marketing area. The respondent's tor-
tious activity is a sufficient minimiim contact with the 
State of Utah to impose jurisdiction under the Long-Arm 
Statute. The respondent's product found its way into 
Utah in a natural, foreseeable and purposeful manner. 
Respondent has therefore purposefully availed them-
selves of the business climate that exists within Utah, 
thereby meeting the minimum contacts of due process 
established by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities 
as cited herein, appellants respectfully request the court 
to reverse the judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, 
WEST & SCHAERRER 
David E. West 
C. Reed Brown 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
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